City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research

New York City College of Technology

2018

Could an Alternative Policy Design Have Produced a Stronger
Mortgage Modification Outcome for HAMP?
Sean MacDonald
CUNY New York City College of Technology

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/ny_pubs/390
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

New York Economic Review

Volume 49, Fall 2018

Could an Alternative Policy Design Have Produced a Stronger
Mortgage Modification Outcome for HAMP?

Sean MacDonald, New York City College of Technology
ABSTRACT
This paper conducts a study of the relative effectiveness of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) - the
primary federal mortgage loan modification program - from early 2009 through 2016. It evaluates U.S. Treasury
Department and other data sources, and reviews the recent literature on the relative success of the program. The
analysis suggests that HAMP’s success rate in modifying mortgage loans was likely constrained by its voluntary design,
a structure that enabled lenders and servicers to prioritize the interests of investors in assessing the risks of
modification. It then considers the economic issues surrounding the foreclosure issue and presents a theoretical
analysis, posing an alternative model illustrating where modification can be cost reducing. Concluding remarks reflect
on the importance of promoting economic stability in policy design.

1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OVERVIEW
Despite indicators of emerging recovery in the U.S. housing market at the end of 2012, the problem of
default and foreclosure remained a significant drag on economic recovery and job growth through 2012.
This was particularly the case in many distressed housing markets nearly six years after the nation’s
foreclosure crisis began following the unraveling of the subprime mortgage market and the housing market
collapse. Numerous policies to stem the rapid growth in foreclosures were introduced and enacted at both
federal and state levels starting in late 2008 and early 2009.
This discussion is focused on a critical evaluation of the relative success rate of the federal Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) from March 2009 when the program took effect through 2016
when the program was scheduled to wind down (excluding modifications still in progress; U.S. Treasury,
Making Home Affordable Q42016). HAMP, whose stated goal is “to offer homeowners who are at risk of
foreclosure reduced monthly mortgage payments that are affordable and sustainable over the long-term,”
has functioned as a voluntary program that relies upon loan servicers to modify the loans of struggling
homeowners through lower monthly payments, thus lowering the risk of foreclosure (U.S. Treasury Dept.
Making Home Affordable 2012).
Despite HAMP’s status as the largest of the government mortgage modification programs, the program
lead to trial {conditional} modifications for just over 2.5 million borrowers at risk of foreclosure by year-end
2016, the overall success rate as measured by the number of permanent modifications relative to total trial
modifications initiated appears to have fallen short of the program’s potential.
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The central argument made here is that the design of the program, which established rather strict
criteria for borrowers to be considered for a modification, and relied on the voluntary participation of
lenders/servicers, essentially ensured that many borrowers in need of loan modifications would simply not
qualify, limiting participation from the outset. In the years immediately following the banking and financial
crisis, lending overall slowed significantly, and servicer resistance to participation in mortgage modification
efforts was evident in the comparatively small number of actual loans modified. Despite one of the key
requirements established under the Temporary Asset Relief Program – that banks’ receiving temporary
assistance - must consider homeowners for a loan modification, there remained no mandatory requirement
that lenders actually modify the loans of homeowners at risk of default and foreclosure. This essentially
enabled servicers for the most part to decide which borrowers they would work with, typically those viewed
as posing the lowest risk of re-default. Even with the modest servicer incentives introduced later in the
program, total permanent modifications as a share of all trial modifications initiated was 38.3 percent
nationally as of year-end 2016.
An overview of the structure of the Home Affordable Modification Program, not only provides a
framework within which to understand the numerous obstacles facing homeowners seeking modifications,
but also reveals the underlying rationale of lenders/servicers in the context of these obstacles.
In early 2009, in an effort to reach growing numbers of troubled borrowers, new foreclosure prevention
measures were introduced, including the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), the Home
Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), and 2MP, a program that offered either modification of or
extinguishment of second liens for homeowners who had already refinanced their primary loan under
HAMP. In February 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department allocated $50 million in TARP funds to help
homeowners struggling with their mortgages.
HAMP and HARP were created as part of the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan in an effort to
help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure either by modifying or refinancing their first mortgages.
Unlike earlier initiatives such as Help for Homeowners (H4H)1 that relied entirely upon the voluntary
participation of lenders and servicers, HAMP required all banks and lending institutions that received
government assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program to initiate loan modifications for loans that
were eligible under HAMP guidelines (Robinson, 2009). However, while this mandate did not apply to nonTARP banks, it was short-lived. In April of 2009, the Treasury Department stipulated that Help for
Homeowners (H4H) should be the primary source for homeowners seeking a modification before applying
under HAMP (Robinson, 2009). In essence, the TARP mandate to lender participation was further
weakened and the process became more bureaucratic for homeowners. In October 2011, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac improved upon HARP-eligible mortgages
by making refinancing possible for borrowers who owed more on their mortgages than their homes were
worth (Fannie Mae, 2012).
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A further change made to the original HAMP program by the Treasury Department was a second lien
modification program, known as 2MP. Participation in 2MP would be limited to borrowers who obtained a
second lien on or before January 1, 2009 and who had already attained a first lien modification under
HAMP. Under 2MP, a second lien that met these requirements would be eligible for either modification or
extinguishment (Robinson, 2009). However, 2MP appeared to have had limited success in attracting lender
participation, with an estimated 163,000 second lien modifications from the program’s inception through
December 2016 (U.S. Treasury Dept., December 2016). The principal obstacle was that a second lien
modification was not possible unless the borrower had first obtained a first lien modification. The significant
numbers of homeowners in negative equity and the continued decline in home values posed a major
obstacle to gaining access to the second lien modification program. This issue is inextricably connected to
the problem of voluntary lender/servicer participation.
Further, HAMP’s own guidelines, established a number of requirements stipulating which borrowers
could qualify for a HAMP modification. From the program’s beginnings in March 2009, borrowers with
conventional loans would qualify if they were delinquent 60 or more days on their mortgages. This
essentially disqualified hundreds of thousands of borrowers (if not more), particularly those who held
subprime loans and were not yet delinquent. These borrowers were among the first to feel the impact of
the housing market collapse, and unaffordable mortgages as a result of spiraling interest rates that were
built into their initial loan terms. At the same time, conventional loan holders who may have suffered a
recent job or income loss, but otherwise had been in good standing on their loan payments were required
to be in delinquency to even begin the process of qualifying for a modification that might either reduce their
principal balance or their interest rate.
Only in late January 2012 did the Treasury Department announce changes that expanded eligibility to
borrowers with non-Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) loans (a move that benefited many subprime
loan holders), established more flexible debt-income criteria, and allowed non-owner-occupied properties
(i.e. those being rented or vacant properties which were being offered for rent) to qualify for a HAMP loan
modification. These changes went into effect on June 1, 2012 (U.S. Treasury, 2012).
Nevertheless, it is argued here that the voluntary feature of the government mortgage loan modification
programs, and of HAMP in particular, coupled with the somewhat stringent requirements for borrowers to
even qualify for a HAMP trial modification during the first four years of the program, was a significant barrier
to the achievement of a higher permanent modification success rate and ultimately reduced its impact on
the nation’s rising foreclosure rate.
This voluntary feature, which is closely tied to the workings of mortgage markets in which investor
interests are prioritized, largely limited the program’s success rate. There is strong evidence in the literature
that this priority took the form of weighing the financial costs of foreclosure versus modification. The findings
suggest that foreclosure often resulted not in a reduction of losses but rather increased losses for investors.
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Thus, the HAMP program essentially deferred to the principal objectives of lenders and servicers to
consider the long-term outcomes for investors of any modification activities.
To obtain further insight into the factors that may have accounted for the program’s diminished impact,
this inquiry begins with an examination of several variables that have been frequently cited in the literature
as constraints on the ability of borrowers to qualify for a loan modification. These challenges include the
large number of homes with negative equity, the high-risk nature of many loans, particularly in the subprime
market, the type of loan modification received, and the complications posed by the initial requirement that
a first lien modification is conditional on the ability to obtain a second lien modification. In many cases, the
lender/servicer of the second lien was different from the servicer of the first lien, which complicated the
modification process. These challenges are then considered in the light of the literature on the character of
mortgage markets which accorded priority to reducing investor losses and which ultimately shaped the
decisions of lenders and servicers to refrain from engaging in larger scale modification efforts.
Within the context of a voluntary modification program, the kind of analysis and policy that informed
actions taken by lenders in the interest of investors on failing mortgages appears to have clearly resulted
in a significantly higher than socially optimal rate of foreclosure. It is apparent that both foreclosure and
modification are costly. However, there are clearly differing circumstances in which modification would be
the less costly course of action and where foreclosure is cost saving. Is there, from an economic costbenefit perspective, a rate of foreclosure that is acceptable from the perspective of lenders and investors –
where the costs of foreclosure are essentially equal to the costs of preventing them through a loan
modification? Under a policy requiring lenders/servicers to evaluate applicants for modification, HAMP
could have realized a higher rate of success if such parameters had been in place. Thus, this study poses
a theoretical model that offers an alternative methodology for assessing the profitability of foreclosure
versus modification based upon a framework for more systematically determining where modification can
be cost saving for the investor as an alternative to foreclosure. At the same time, the theory considers the
particular social and economic circumstances in which modification offers greater benefits for the borrower,
the community and the economy overall.

2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: OBSTACLES TO LOAN MODIFICATION
A number of factors have been widely identified in the literature that would appear to pose challenges
to the success of loan modification programs. The assessment in much of the literature is that the forces
that led to the foreclosure crisis continued to pose barriers to successful loan modification. These factors
include the pervasive practice of low doc and no doc loans along with poor underwriting standards and
deteriorating loan quality, particularly in the subprime market (Been, et al., 2011; LaCour-Little, et al., 2009);
the large numbers of mortgages with second liens (Been, et al, 2011; LaCour-Little, et al., 2009); smaller
down payments and a run-up in borrowing against home equity while home prices were still rising, coupled
with declines in home price appreciation that began well before the crisis unfolded (Gerardi, et al, 2011).
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This literature considers these dynamics, along with rising and persistent high unemployment in the wake
of the crisis, the worsening negative equity position of a growing number of borrowers, and stagnant and/or
continued weak recovery in home values as posing significant challenges to attaining higher rates of
successful modification.
LaCour-Little, et al (2013), studying a sample of 218,000 ALT-A and subprime home loans originated
between 2000 and 2007 and securitized by Bear Stearns, found that the share with full documentation
declined quite significantly from 42.4 percent to 21.6 percent over this period, while the share with low
documentation increased from 11.5 percent to 69.3 percent. The loans, close to three-quarters of which
were ARMs, were found to be associated with a significantly high default risk (2013).
The large number of mortgages with second liens is identified as posing one of the greatest
impediments to refinancing (Been, et. al., 2011; LaCour-Little, et. Al. 2009). It is estimated that between 40
and 45 percent of new mortgage loans originated at the height of the housing boom (2005-2007) included
a second lien or piggyback mortgage which enabled borrowers with less than a 20 percent down payment
to purchase a home, particularly in high cost coastal markets and in markets where house prices
accelerated comparatively rapidly (Haughwout, et. al., 2012). This same research also documents that both
the number of and value of closed end second liens as opposed to home equity lines of credit (HELOCs)
constituted a relatively small percentage of originations in 1999 compared with their peak in 2006.
A broad cross-section of the literature is largely consistent in pinpointing the crisis in the subprime
mortgage market beginning in 2006 as the catalyst for much of the larger housing market collapse that
followed (Gerardi, and Willen, 2008; Gerardi, et al., 2011; Been, et al., 2011; Rugh and Massey, 2010;
Bromley, et al., 2008).
In the years immediately prior to the housing market collapse, increasing numbers of borrowers,
particularly in the subprime market, were making very small down payments at the time of purchase, and
in many cases, putting zero money down. At the same time, many borrowers who had purchased years
before the onset of the crisis, had been withdrawing extraordinary amounts of equity while home prices
were still rising, (Gerardi, et al, 2011). This created heightened risk once home prices stalled and began
their steep decline. These two conditions alone would clearly pose challenges to refinancing in a down
market. After the market peaked, large numbers of homeowners – both subprime and prime - found
themselves with negative equity.
Other studies examining the mixed success rates of mortgage modification efforts focus on the
persistent complications posed by second liens, negative equity, the failure of modifications to reduce
principal balances, and the perception that modification poses a relatively greater cost to investors than
foreclosure. Also considered are the shortcomings of the various government loan modification programs
introduced in the wake of the foreclosure crisis.
Been, et. al. (2011) point out that HAMP’s success was to a significant degree constrained by the
presence of a second mortgage. “Second liens significantly complicate modifications because first lien
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holders may lose their senior status upon modification,” and thus first lien holders are reluctant to agree to
participate in a modification unless second lien holders agree to subordinate their liens to the newly modified
mortgage (pg 382). As the authors point out, few have chosen to do so. Examining a sample of zip codelevel and state data, LaCour-Little, et al., (2009), found that the percentage of piggyback originations from
2001 – 2008 was positively correlated with higher foreclosure rates in subsequent years. Their findings
confirm that second liens rose rapidly during the housing boom and were a major contributing factor to
underwater mortgages in the face of the sharp decline of home prices after the peak. They specifically
looked at whether states and zip codes with a higher proportion of piggyback loans originated during the
2001 - 2006 period experienced increased rates of delinquency and foreclosure. Their findings indicated
that second lien originations to subprime borrowers were significantly related to higher rates of foreclosure
after 2006. This outcome strongly suggests that borrowers with second liens were likely to be less
successful in obtaining a loan modification. However, the findings did not especially hold for prime secondlien borrowers (LaCour-Little, et al, 2009). Nevertheless, given the time of their study, it may have been too
early to see the full effects of declining home equity coupled with a second lien, which affected large swaths
of the home-owning population nationwide, as unemployment rose and home prices continued to decline
throughout 2010 and 2011.
The problem of rapidly deteriorating home equity as housing prices fell posed another hurdle to
borrowers hoping to qualify for a loan modification. Not until the introduction of the Home Affordable
Refinance Program’s ‘HARP 2.0’ in 2011, which allowed refinancing of up to 125 percent of a home’s
original mortgage, was the problem of rising negative equity as a barrier to qualifying for a loan modification
directly addressed (U.S. Treasury, 2011).
Other inquiries, conducted relatively early in the course of the rapid rise in distressed properties, found
strong evidence that principal balance reductions were associated with the strongest modification success
rates for borrowers. The State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group(SFPWG)2 (Aug. 2010), analyzing a
longitudinal dataset of nine loan servicers in New York State in 2007 before the crisis peaked, found that
modifications that included significant reductions in the principal balance tended to have lower re-default
rates than their counterparts. This finding led the group to recommend reducing principal balances on loans
in areas experiencing significant home price declines. However, modifications with a significant reduction
in principal balance represented just 20 percent of the loan modifications that the State Foreclosure
Prevention Working Group (SFPWG, 2010) studied.
Similarly, Querci and Ding (2009) found that borrowers were less likely to re-default on their home
mortgage when their monthly payments were reduced through a balance-reducing loan modification. Using
data from a large sample of recently modified subprime loans, the authors looked at the question of why
some loan modifications were more likely to re-default than others. At the same time, they examined the
characteristics of modifications that were more likely to re-default within a short-term period. Their findings
confirmed that modifications that involved a significant reduction in mortgage payments tended to result in
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more sustainable short-term modifications, and that re-default rates are further reduced when payment
reductions also include a reduction in principal balances.3 Nevertheless, such modifications were often the
exception as reflected in the 2010 SFPWG study.
With the onset of the financial crisis in late 2008, the SFPWG concluded that a comprehensive
approach to loan modification was necessary. At the time the organization issued its fourth report in January
2010, it was estimated that just four out of ten seriously delinquent borrowers were on track for any kind of
loan modification. The authors also concluded that while the HAMP program increased the percentage of
borrowers participating in some form of loan modification, the rapidly rising number of such delinquent
borrowers meant that HAMP had merely been able to slow the foreclosure crisis, and that its efforts have
not been able to keep pace with the rising scale of delinquencies (SFPWG, Jan. 2010).
However, despite the compelling evidence that HAMP was at best able to slow the pace of the
foreclosure process by gradually qualifying more borrowers for modifications, and the findings of studies
that principal balance reductions were clearly most successful in reducing re-default risk and benefitting
borrowers, modifications continued to proceed at a relatively slow pace relative to the rising rates of default
and foreclosure (SFPWG, 2010; Statistic Brain, 2016) and the share of such modifications that reduced
principal balances remained comparatively small.
The numerous obstacles to successful loan modification for countless borrowers in the aftermath of the
housing crisis that these studies reveal appear to be linked to a key issue: that the voluntary design of the
HAMP program, together with the primary goal of lenders/servicers to prioritize efforts to protect investors
– a goal which itself shaped their voluntary participation – posed a significant barrier to a more robust
success rate for HAMP. The voluntary structure of the HAMP program in essence deferred to the principal
objective of lenders and servicers to consider the long-term outcomes for investors of any modification
activities. This is highlighted in several studies that have placed the lower than potential rate of modification
in perspective.
Foote et. al., (2010); Adelino, et. al., (2009), White, (2009) and Piekorski (2011) focus on the central
issue of potential losses to investors of re-default risk of modified loans in the face of rising job loss and
home price depreciation. Foote et. al. (2010) find evidence that the unwillingness of many mortgage
servicers to make large scale modifications is linked to the finding that the losses to investors from
foreclosure are actually less than from modification, especially when modifications are done ‘en masse’
(2010). This would seem counterintuitive. However, the authors provide evidence that the added risk of
borrowers re-defaulting on the modified loan enhances the potential losses to investors from modification
vs. foreclosure. Thus, they conclude that foreclosure prevention policies aimed at reducing high debt-toincome ratios and borrowers’ interest rates may not effectively reduce what they point to as the key source
of loan defaults – falling home prices and job loss (pg. 91). In other words, perceived re-default risk may
have much more to do with plummeting values of the asset – homes -combined with rapidly escalating
unemployment across the economy, both of which pose a high re-default risk. From a net present value
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perspective, they argue that most “potential modifications are negative-NPV transactions from the
standpoint of investors” (120).
Finally, there is the argument that some servicers were better equipped than others by virtue of their
organizational capacity to process larger numbers of modifications than were others resulting in uneven
outcomes across servicers (Agarwal et. al. (2012). Thus, the success rate of mortgage debt adjustment
succeeded in assisting a significantly smaller percentage of households – approximately 30 percent based
on the authors’ study - relative to the total who qualified (pg. 4). The authors examine the variance in lender
participation in the context of NPV considerations (pg.24). They find that a number of modified loans redefault following modification, while others that were initially delinquent emerge from delinquency without
modification (i.e. they are self-cured). Overall, they find that a loan that is delinquent and which does not
‘self-cure’ has a 50 to 60 percent probability of ending up in foreclosure (Argarwal et. al., 2012).
What many of these studies share in common, including those that have analyzed mortgage loan data
sets, (Adelino, et. al., 2009, Foote, et. al., 2010, LaCour-Little, 2009) is the conclusion that the securitization
process in which mortgage loans are re-sold as investments, was not responsible for the low rate of
modifications. Rather, the role of NPV calculations in deciding whether losses from foreclosure will be less
than those from modification is central to the decision of a lender/servicer to participate in modifying a loan.
The studies reach similar conclusions that confirm the centrality of loss mitigation concerns and therefore
offer added insight into the problems associated with voluntary participation in HAMP.
Thus, the many obvious obstacles to obtaining a loan modification discussed in the literature on
negative equity, second liens, and loan modification type, can be understood in the larger context of the
very risk that modification posed to investors and that lenders/servicers weighed in considering the extent
of their participation in modification efforts. Investors were clearly aware of the growing risk posed by rising
and stubbornly high unemployment coupled with the deteriorating value of their assets – homes - and their
central concern which was to protect the value of that asset. This perceived risk illuminates the pervasive
uncertainty about the future direction of the economy that constrained broader participation in HAMP and
provides a more far-reaching context within which to understand the program’s limited success.

3. SUMMARY OF HAMP OUTCOMES
An overview of key program outcomes between 2009 through 2011, as housing prices showed signs
of reaching a bottom, offers some perspective on the overwhelming hurdles HAMP faced given its built-in
constraints as well as the many challenges borrowers confronted in renegotiating their home mortgages.
This may place into perspective the risks borrowers were considered to pose in the context of depressed
home prices and worsening economic conditions. In 2011 IIQ, 22.1 percent of residential properties with a
mortgage - an estimated 10.7 million homes – were still in negative equity nationwide, while more than twothirds of mortgage holders on such properties were paying above market interest rates (CoreLogic, 2011).
This reflected only slight improvement from 2009 IIIQ when 24 percent of properties were in negative equity
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(Warren, 2009; CoreLogic, Nov. 2009). That the negative equity rate remained essentially flat for two years
following the official end of the recession in June 2009 reveals one of the challenges faced by HAMP as
both modification applications and foreclosures also continued to rise.
By year-end 2016, the percentage of mortgaged homes in negative equity declined significantly to 6.2
percent. Interestingly, however, the overwhelming majority of homes with equity at year end 2016 – 96
percent - were concentrated at the higher end of the market, where homes are valued at $200,000 and
over (Core Logic, IVQ 2016).
The negative equity problem was also reflected in home price declines during the crisis and in the years
immediately following. The seasonally adjusted S&P Case-Shiller 20-city U.S. national home price index
(quarterly) shows that the national market bottomed out in 2012 IQ after peaking in 2006 IIIQ. Over this
period, U.S. home prices overall lost 36.9 percent of their value (S&P Case Shiller, 2017). By 2016 IVQ,
home prices recovered 27 percent from their pre-recession peak.
The unemployment rate, which peaked at 10.0 percent in October 2009, did not dip below 6 percent
until September 2014 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Nationally, 962,209 homeowners out of 2,511,344 who entered into a first lien trial modification from
HAMP’s inception in March 2009 through December 2016 completed a permanent modification of their
home mortgage through the program. In total, 1,683,112 borrowers entered into a trial first lien permanent
modification. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, QIV 2016). Among completed modifications, this represents
a national success rate of 38.3 percent and 67 percent when cumulative trial modifications are included.
200,552 permanent modifications featured a principal balance reduction through 2016, while 290,279 such
modifications were in trial accounting for just 8.0 percent and 11.6 percent, respectively of all first lien trial
modifications started.4 Under HAMP’s Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative, borrowers denied a HAMP
modification were required to be considered for a plan enabling them to exit their mortgage obligation
through either a deed-in-lieu or a short sale. However, individual investors could impose further eligibility
requirements (U.S. Department of the Treasury, QIV 2016) which could have made obtaining this option
more of a challenge for some borrowers.
Through December 2016, successful second lien modifications also represented a relatively small
proportion of total modifications nationally. As of year-end 2016, 163,140 second liens had entered the 2MP
modification program. Just 48,318 of these resulted in a full extinguishment of the second lien, while another
10, 470 received a partial lien extinguishment. The remaining 79,343 second liens were in active
modification status. Just five servicers accounted for 85 percent of second lien modifications through
December 2016 (U.S. Treasury, 2016), representing a fraction of total servicers nationwide.
A further comparison with national foreclosure data indicates an even smaller successful modification
rate. More than 6.2 million foreclosures nationally were completed from 2009 through 2016 (Core Logic,
March 2017). When compared to the 962,209 distressed mortgage holders who received a permanent loan
modification, the percentage of successful modifications drops to 15.5 percent of troubled mortgages over
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this seven-year period. The data on completed foreclosures appears to confirm that foreclosure was the
overwhelming direction taken relative to modifications.
The percent share of loan modifications among the top seven servicers through December 2016 reveals
mixed outcomes. These ranged from a low of 2.7 percent for CitiMortgage, Inc. to a high of just 21 percent
for Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, a subprime lender. Ocwen also accounted for the largest percentage of
modifications featuring a principal balance reduction at nearly 49 percent of the total. These data also
highlight the comparatively low percentage – 10.2 percent - that principal balance reductions made up of
total modifications (U.S. Treasury, 2016).
HAMP modifications among investor groups include all HAMP Tiers 1 and 2 and Streamline permanent
modifications. The data suggest that loans held by the GSEs and by private investors had a larger
proportion of permanent modifications compared to loans held in portfolio. The GSEs accounted for 39
percent and private investors 44.1 percent of permanent modifications relative to just 16.9 percent for loans
held in portfolio.
The comparatively small number of permanent modifications attained relative to foreclosures from
the inception of the Home Affordable Modification Program in early 2009 through year-end 2016 should
also be viewed from the perspective of the impact of foreclosures in an economy that experienced a
prolonged and steep decline following the housing market collapse. Foreclosures accelerated rapidly from
2007 through 2010, and while the policy response in the form of modification initiatives such as Help for
Homeowners and HAMP helped to reduce the impact, the sizeable number of foreclosed properties in
communities across the country had a direct impact on already declining property values in those markets.
If a servicer or investor is more reluctant to modify a distressed underwater mortgage, the choice to
foreclose instead simply exacerbates the problem and adds to a glut of vacated or abandoned properties,
further dragging down the value of surrounding homes, increasing the economic costs. This affects all
homeowners, not just those struggling to pay their mortgages and as the repercussions in the form of
declining household wealth are experienced across the economy, the social and economic costs of
foreclosure are magnified.
The following discussion outlines a theoretical framework for understanding the economic issues and
pressures that HAMP intended to address in the midst of a foreclosure crisis in which the economic interests
of borrowers, servicers and investors were often at odds. The policy structure of the program ultimately
resulted in a lower than optimal modification success rate. Given that foreclosures are both costly to prevent
and to carry out, the discussion proposes a model for how the modification success rate could have been
greater in the context of HAMP’s voluntary structure and how the problem of lenders who made risky
mortgages that contributed to a large share of the problem might have been addressed differently.
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Table 1: Making Home Affordable Program Activity by Servicer: March 2009 - December 2016
Servicer

HAMP Tier 1

HAMP Tier 2

Streamline

PRA

2MP

HAFA12 non-

Servicer

Permanent

Permanent

HAMP

Permanent

Modifications

GSE

Total

Modifications

Modifications

Permanent

Modifications

Transactions

Modifications

Bank

Completed

of

103,134

8,004

N/A*

5,885

38,499

49,861

205,383

CitiMortgage,

32,881

3,784

0

3,233

20,341

2,487

62,726

162,915

5,579

2,077

25,441

44,703

38,215

278,860

183,837

25,425

1,580

11,225

9,810

11,270

243,147

244,433

80,809

13,951

115,433

N/A*

29,128

483,754

114,438

27,565

8,503

21,360

N/A*

22,374

194,240

199,734

12,368

0

30,432

25,032

44,639

312,205

417,151

33,495

1,449

22,572

24,755

30,982

530,404

1,458,523

197,029

27,560

235,581

163,140

228,956

2,310,719

America,
N.A.

Inc.
JPMorgan
Chase Bank,
N.A.
Nationstar
Mortgage
LLC
Ocwen Loan
Servicing,
LLC
Select
Portfolio
Servicing,
Inc.
Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.
Other
Servicers
Total

Source: U.S. Treasury Department, December 2016 MHA Report. (It should be noted here that servicers report all trial
modifications as permanent modifications).
*Servicer does not participate in either Streamline HAMP or HAMP 2MP.
11
Principal Reduction Alternative
12
HAFA: Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (This program offered incentives to homeowners to terminate their mortgage
commitment or to sell a rental property through a short sales or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure).
Notes from “Select HAMP Modification Characteristics” (p. 8, Making Home Affordable: HAMP Program Results: Program Performance
Report Fourth Quarter 2016)
**Under HAMP Tier 1, servicers apply the modification steps in sequence until the homeowner’s post-modification front-end
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is 31%. The impact of each modification step can vary to achieve the target of 31%.
**Under HAMP Tier 2, servicers apply the modification steps simultaneously to achieve a post-modification DTI that falls within
an allowable range (subject to investor restrictions). HAMP Tier 2 applies to non-GSE mortgages only.
**Under Streamline HAMP, seriously delinquent homeowners who have not been able to complete a HAMP application may be
eligible to receive mortgage assistance through a combination of modification steps similar to HAMP Tier 2. Unlike Tier 1 and
Tier 2, Streamline HAMP does not require that borrowers document their income.
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Table 2: HAMP Permanent Modifications by Investor
Servicer

All HAMP Permanent Modifications
GSE

Private

Portfolio

Total

Bank of America, N.A.

39,182

53,663

18,293

111,138

CitiMortgage, Inc.

15,182

9,223

12,260

36,665

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

69,483

56,806

44,282

170,571

Nationstar Mortgage LLC

119,528

82,379

8,935

210,842

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

23,257

293,966

21,970

339,193

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

14,654

115,137

20,715

150,506

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

80,487

42,034

89,581

212,102

Other Servicers

295,093

89,342

67,660

452,095

Total

656,866

742,550

283,696

1,683,112

Source: U.S. Treasury Department, December 2016 MHA Report (all permanent modifications started are
reported by servicers as permanent HAMP modifications).

4. UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC CONFLICTS: A THEORETICAL MODEL
What were the economic issues at the heart of the conflicting interests of borrowers and
lenders/servicers and investors? How did the tensions between these competing economic interests result
in a less than optimal rate of successful loan modification and a higher rate of foreclosures? How did the
structure of HAMP policy contribute to a less than optimal loan modification rate? How might outcomes
have been different had policy been structured with the goal of bringing the economic interests of borrowers
as well as servicers/investors into closer alignment?
To place the economic issues in perspective, consider the developments that contributed to the crisis.
Banks and other lenders, encouraged by an improving economy in the early 2000’s and an increased
demand for homes made more mortgage loans to buyers. At the same time subprime lending, once a very
small portion of the mortgage market grew to constitute 20 percent of all loans at the peak of the housing
boom by 2005 from less than 5 percent in 1994 (Doms, et.al.,2007). An expanding range of increasingly
exotic mortgages enabled buyers – both prime and subprime – to purchase homes that they otherwise may
not have been able to afford. Subprime loans which typically came with a higher rate of interest were
particularly attractive to investors in mortgage backed securities as these offered a higher rate of return.
The combination of exotic, risky and high interest loans and the increasing demand from investors for more
such loans encouraged more risk taking on the part of lenders as more borrowers, including many who
would otherwise not qualify were approved for loans, often with little documentation.
As borrower delinquency rates, initially on subprime loans, began to noticeably rise during 2006 into
2007, it was initially believed that the crisis could be contained within the subprime sector but as
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delinquencies trended upward even among seemingly solid borrowers with fixed interest loans, it became
evident that it could not. With the deteriorating economy shedding jobs at accelerated pace, the foreclosure
rate increased rapidly, pointing to the mounting social and economic costs to come. As the housing market
collapse unfolded and a full blown financial crisis now threatened the entire economy, investors sought to
minimize their losses and many borrowers sought to hold on to their homes. The tension between these
competing interests intensified as foreclosure prevention measures were implemented in a number of
states. New York, for instance, mandated pre-foreclosure notices to delinquent borrowers and set up
housing counseling and other services to assist borrowers at risk of losing their homes. It became clear that
a torrent of foreclosed properties hurts not just families, but the viability of entire communities, local property
tax revenue, and the entire economy. From the investors’ perspective, the overriding interest in protecting
the value of their assets and cutting their losses in the face of declining home values left little motivation to
modify loans.
The policy response - the Home Affordable Modification Program - seemed to recognize these economic
tensions. However, in seeking to align the interests of borrowers and lenders/servicers and the investors
they represent, the program fell far short. A higher rate of successful modifications would have been likely
if certain program features had not limited the scope of both lender and borrower participation by
establishing unrealistic barriers. The requirement that any applicant must already be delinquent on
payments by 60 days or more essentially meant that many borrowers in high-cost mortgages had to choose
between a greater likelihood of default sometime in the future or deliberately not making mortgage
payments and gambling that they could qualify for a modification. Second, had there been no requirement
that second lien modifications could only be considered if a first lien modification had first been attained,
many more borrowers could have qualified. On the lender/servicer side, the requirement that borrowers be
considered for a modification should have applied to all lenders, not just those receiving TARP funds.
Further, had non-GSE lenders, many of whom were originators of subprime loans, been included in that
requirement from the inception of HAMP, a larger pool of loans would have qualified for modification. All of
these constraints resulted in far fewer permanent modifications than otherwise would have been possible.
A 38.3 percent success rate among more than 2.5 million applicants who qualified and a 15.5 percent rate
relative to 6.2 million foreclosures completed over this period is far less than optimal.
Beyond these shortcomings, what might have produced a more effective policy outcome? From the
perspective of servicers and the investors holding mortgages, is there a rate of foreclosure where the harm
resulting from foreclosures is roughly equivalent to the cost of averting them? Given that the economic
costs of foreclosure extend well beyond the impact on the individual borrower and the individual
servicer/investor, how could foreclosure rates have been reduced (and modification rates increased) to the
point where the social and economic costs associated with foreclosures were in closer alignment with
servicer/investor costs of preventing them? The following discussion proposes measures that could be a
step in the direction of narrowing that gap.
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First, suppose HAMP guidelines had mandated that all lenders/servicers participate in the program,
considering the cost savings from modification vs. foreclosure based on a cost benefit approach - evaluating
the actual costs of each decision. Lender/servicer motivations for foreclosing rather than modifying would
be driven by an estimate of the actual costs of carrying out each action. So how can the costs be placed in
context? An estimated 11.3 million – 24 percent – of homes with a mortgage were in negative equity in Q3
2009 in the depths of the Great Recession, while the average dollar amount of negative equity at the time
was $70,000 (CoreLogic Q3 2009). The higher the negative equity share, the greater was the probability of
receiving a pre-foreclosure notice (CoreLogic Q3 2009) and thus, the greater the probability of foreclosure.
It is quite likely, given the 6.2 million foreclosures between 2009 and 2016, that many of these properties
ended in foreclosure.
1) Assume that the original mortgage = M₀ and the modified mortgage with principal balance = M₁ .
The costs (C) of modification equal total principal balance reduced of the negative equity amount (N).
C = M₀ -N = M₁.
Assume that M₀ = $300, 000 and negative equity = $70,000; then M₁ ≥ $230,000, but ≤ $299,999.
If it is assumed that the average household mortgage was $300,000 in 2009 with average negative
equity of $70,000 for the 24 percent of homes with a mortgage this constitutes a loss for the homeowner
and the lender, either of whom could be on the losing end as a result. The borrower who can afford to, will
continue making the mortgage payments. However, in the case of borrowers who put little money down
and purchased a house that their incomes could not support – the question is how much of a mortgage
they can afford to pay. If that number lies somewhere between $230,000 and $299,999, the lender (or
investor holding the mortgage), should have an incentive to negotiate a principal balance reduction. A new
mortgage of $230,000 would mean that both borrower and lender break even since the home is now worth
$230,000.
2) Now suppose the borrower can afford a modified mortgage with a principal balance reduction greater
than $230,000. The borrower is assuming some of the negative equity. Here N assumes a value of $50,000.
In this case, if a principal balance reduction to $250,000 is negotiated between borrower and lender, the
lender attains an asset whose value is $230,000 and acquires $20,000, bypassing the expense of a
potentially costly foreclosure process. Assuming half of the 11.3 million mortgage holders in negative equity
were among those who could afford to pay this new principal balance, 5.65 million foreclosures would be
avoided, borrowers would not lose the money already invested in their homes, and investors would retain
their assets.
3) Suppose another 3 million borrowers could not afford a mortgage of $250,000, but could manage a
loan payment between $200,000 and $230,000, then the costs and benefits of foreclosure – such as the
legal costs of carrying out foreclosure actions against borrowers, continued erosion of home values, the
costs of preparing documentation, etc. must be weighed, since any renegotiated mortgage less than the
property’s value would impose a cost on the lender. Assuming these foreclosure costs average $30,000,
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the lender could agree to reduce the principal balance to $215,000 and potentially save $15,000 in
foreclosure costs. Here, the costs of foreclosure avoidance (F) are still positive and:
M₁ = M₀ - N - (30,000 – 15,000) = $215,000.
The balance could be further reduced to as low as $200,000 for some borrowers and the lender would
break even. Overall, such a scenario would potentially avoid another 3 million foreclosures and investors
would again retain their assets.
M₁ = M₀ - N – (30,000 – 0) = $200,000.
What about the cost to investors? While ultimately, the costs of modification are borne by the investor
while benefiting the homeowner, additional requirements stipulating that lender and investor share in the
gain from a modified mortgage would ensure the benefits are distributed to both parties. In the case where
the lender/servicer gains $20,000 from a modified loan of $250,000, half of that acquisition would go to the
investor. In the case of the $215,000 loan, the same requirement would apply. Assuming some
modifications result in a principal balance reduction to $200,000, the investor writes off the loss of $30,000
in equity at the time the mortgage is modified, but still retains the asset. At the same time, the larger
economy benefits from having fewer foreclosed houses on the market to further bring down property values,
drain tax revenues and further weaken economic recovery.
However, what about borrowers who are still unable to afford a $200,000 modified mortgage? Employing
the same example, in such cases where foreclosure is more likely, the lender would acquire the property
and find a new buyer. However, several questions arise. What kind of loan was made to the borrower (i.e.,
high interest, interest only, negative amortizing, etc.)? Was little or no documentation required? If the loan
was high risk, the lender should be held accountable for contributing to the excessive systemic risk that led
to widespread default rates and the plummeting home values, job losses and financial crisis that nearly led
to economic collapse.
Originators of high-risk loans, many of which were subprime, would be required to bear some of the
costs of their decisions. A number of factors might be weighed in determining that cost. In the case of
borrowers who put money down, how much did they pay? How much principal had already been paid?
Were any improvements made to the home? In every instance, what is the cost to the homeowner of
packing up and moving out? Compensation to displaced homeowners should at the very least be based on
such costs borne by the homeowner. Further, the lender would be required to contribute a portion of those
costs to state and/or federal level foreclosure prevention programs. If it is assumed that homeowner costs
are $10,000, then the lender pays $8,000 to the borrower to offset the costs of finding new housing and
contributes $2,000 to the state or federal program. Such measures send a clear message: that contributing
to systemic risk requires sharing responsibility and payment of some kind of penalty.
Finally, there were clearly many otherwise creditworthy borrowers who became delinquent and went
into default following job loss. As the unemployment rate quickly rose during the Great Recession, the odds
that these homeowners would be able to resume payments after just a few months and/or upon finding a
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new job were slim. Average unemployment duration was more than 24 weeks in 2009, and averaged 37
weeks over 2010-2012 when the effects of the recession were still being felt (Statista, 2017), making default
far more likely.
HAMP included an unemployment program in which homeowners could be approved either for a
forbearance plan with some payment required or with no payment required for 12 months, allowing
homeowners to seek new employment without losing their homes. However, of the 46,485 applicants who
were approved for and started the plans, 24 percent remained current on payments after 12 months (MHA
Quarterly Report, Q4 2016). Clearly, this has some positive economic impact. A 2016 study found that …”
foreclosure delay during the recession improved the quality of new employment matches, raised national
income by about 0.3 percent and increased homeownership by about 800,000 units (Herkenhoff and
Ohanian, 2016).
However, might the success rate have been higher if, in addition to forbearance, unemployed borrowers
had been evaluated for a mortgage modification with a principal balance reduction, applying the same
guidelines as those detailed above? In this case, once borrowers resume making the resulting lower
payments, the end result may have resulted in a lower re-default rate. Given that for another 32 percent of
homeowners, the final outcome was bankruptcy, action pending or a charge off, while another 6 percent
re-entered the foreclosure process or a deed-in-lieu, principal balance reductions could have produced a
stronger forbearance success rate.

5. CONCLUSIONS
Clearly the challenges borrowers faced in renegotiating their home mortgages illustrates the risks they
were considered to pose in the context of depressed home prices and worsening economic conditions.
The application of a model based on the framework posed here would bring foreclosure prevention into
closer alignment with the goal of protecting investors. This actually requires lenders/servicers to reach a
modification agreement with applicants where possible. The result, where borrowers, lenders/servicers and
investors benefit from the outcome not only reduces the social disruptions caused by massive foreclosures,
but helps to minimize the larger economic costs, potentially easing the impact of a steep downturn,
stabilizing affected communities, and stemming the blight of foreclosed properties in neighborhoods already
experiencing eroding home values. At the same time, the property tax base in those communities is
stabilized at a time when revenue needs are greatest.
Preventing even a significant percentage of the 6.2 million foreclosures that occurred between 2009 and
2016 could have resulted in significantly less income and wealth loss in the economy, while avoiding the
costs of foreclosure incurred both by the homeowner and financial institutions, as well as the various
government entities involved in legal processing of foreclosure actions.
The data and the analysis reviewed on HAMP’s outcomes in successful permanent modification of
distressed home loans suggest that policy design is critical. National policy design must be more robust in
92

New York Economic Review

Volume 49, Fall 2018

addressing the larger picture, in this case the economy-wide costs of widespread foreclosure both during
and in the immediate aftermath of a steep downturn such as the Great Recession. This requires
lender/servicer participation and the establishment of a set of guidelines for their participation. Those posed
here offer a framework for thinking about such participation. At the very least, this should oblige
lenders/servicers to evaluate not only the costs but the immediate and long-term benefits of loan
modification. The perspective offered here may offer a starting point for more formal analyses that evaluate
sample data on foreclosure outcomes over the course of HAMP’s modification program.

ENDNOTES
1.

Hope for Homeowners (H4H), the initial program introduced in late 2008 in the final months of the
Bush Administration, enabled underwater borrowers to refinance into an FHA guaranteed
mortgage. H4H relied upon the voluntary participation of lenders and servicers. Prior to 2008, when
the first signs of soaring foreclosure rates began to appear principally in the subprime market,
efforts which encouraged lenders and servicers to work with subprime borrowers to modify their
high variable interest rate loans into fixed rate loans, relied upon voluntary participation in such
efforts by lenders and loan servicers.

2.

The Subprime Foreclosure Prevention Working Group consisted of several state attorneys general
and state bank supervisors.

3.

Following changes made to the Treasury Department’s guidelines under the terms of the HAMP
Principal Reduction Alternative, servicers of non-GSE loans were required to evaluate borrowers
for a principal reduction (although they are not required to provide such a modification) under the
terms of the national mortgage settlement (U.S. Treasury, Dec. 2012) with the nation’s five largest
servicers. As a result, many servicers began to increase the use of non-PRA principal reductions
after 2012.

4.

Based on the details of U.S. Treasury HAMP reports, one of the principal reasons has had much
to do with policy guidelines and limitations under HAMP that were still in effect through year-end
2012. Those guidelines stated that while both GSE and non-GSE loans (i.e. many subprime loans)
were eligible to participate in a HAMP modification, GSE policy (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac)
stipulated that servicers can only offer a principal balance reduction – a PRA (or Principal Reduction
Alternative) on non-GSE modifications under HAMP (2012).
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